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FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC LAW
STANLEY M. GROSSMAN
FREDERICK M. HART

and administrative activities, rather than judicial
LEGISLATIVE
developments, have taken the forefront of progress in Food and
Drug law for 1959. New color additive legislation appears imminent
and necessary because of the strict regulatory actions instituted pursuant to the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the Florida Citrus
case. An administrative press release concerning contaminated cranberries precipitated a major industry crisis as well as questions of
unique legal significance. Implementation of the 1958 Food Additives
Amendment continued its pioneering course, especially in its application to packaging.
Color Additives.-Under the existing coal-tar color provisions of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exchange/ the Food and
Drug Administration is without power to set safe limits of use for
colors found not to be harmless for unrestricted uses. Consequently,
a substantial number of commercial colors are being delisted and, with
the use of newer scientific procedures in re-examining previously certified colors, further delistings may be expected.2 The administration
cannot certify the absolute safety of a color while there is even a
remote degree of toxicity in any quantity of use.
Intended in part to remedy this stinted application of the law,
a new color additive bill has been passed by the Senate and is awaiting
action in the House.3 The House bill contains the controversial "DeStanley M. Grossman is Director of the Food Law Program and Instructor in
Law at New York University School of Law and a Member of the New York Bar.
Frederick M. Hart, a past Director of the Food Law Program, is Professor of
Law at Albany Law School and a Member of the District of Columbia and New
York Bars.
1 358 U.S. 153, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. U7468 (1958).
2 Four yellow coal-tar colors were delisted for unrestricted use on Feb. 6, 1959,
although their e.'Cternal use in drugs and cosmetics may be authorized. 24 Fed. Reg. 883
(1959). The use of Citrus Red No. 2 to color the skins of oranges has been authorized
from May 1, 1959 to Sept. 1, 1961. 73 Stat. 3, amending 21 U.S.C. § 342(c) (1958). On
April 15, 1959, a proposal was made to remove seventeen colors used principally in
lipsticks from the approved unrestricted cosmetic list. 24 Fed. Reg. 2873 (1959). The
most recent proposal, 24 Fed. Reg. 8503 (1959), would delist F.D. & C. Orange Nos. 3
and 4.
3 S. 2197, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), was passed on August 24, 1959, 105 Cong.
Rec. 15394 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1959); H.R. 7624, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), was referred to the House Commitee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 105 Cong. Rec.
15558 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1959).
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Janey Cancer-Clause,m but in other respects is the same as the
Senate's. If enacted, the bills will provide generally for: ( 1) extension
of the current act's provisions ( including certification procedures) to
noncoal-tar as well as coal-tar colors, (2) the setting of safe tolerance
levels and uses, ( 3) pretesting and safety clearance requirements. 11
Informational Releases.-In a statement by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare released at a pre-Thanksgiving Day
news conference, a warning was issued concerning the contamination of
cranberries by the possibly carcinogenic weed-killer, Aminotriazole. 6
This action, authorized by the statute7 and established in past practice,
had far-reaching effect upon the public and the subject industry, and
has drawn considerable attention toward this formidable power of
"regulation by press release." Such news releases can have the substantial effect of a multiple seizure. Questions have been raised as to
the practical limits of this administrative sanction and the availability
of legal redress should such discretionary power be ever abused.8
Another aspect of the cranberry episode was the refusal of the
administration to establish a tolerance for any amount of the carcinogene, even though the Pesticides Amendment9 ( which, unlike the
Food Additives Amendment, contains no "cancer-clause") was applicable to the cranberries. The Secretary explained the refusal by
stating that "while in theory there may be a minute quantity of a
carcinogene which is safe in foods, in actuality our scientists do not
4 The cancer provision inserted in the 1958 Food Additives Amendment, 72 Stat.
1785, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1958), through the efforts of Congressman James J.
Delaney, reads in part that no additive shall be deemed safe, "if it is found to induce
cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man
or animal .•.."
5 See S. Rep. No. 795, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
6 Statement by Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
at a news conference, Washington, D.C., Nov. 9, 1959, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep.
1! 7532 (1959).
7 "The Secretary may also cause to be disseminated information regarding food,
drugs, devices, or cosmetics in situations involving, in the opinion of the Secretary,
imminent danger to health or gross deception of the consumer." 52 Stat. 1058 (1938),
21 u.s.c. § 375(b) (1958).
8 In Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm.
L. Rep. 1f 7417 (D.D.C. 1957), plaintiff argued that public warnings against use of his
cancer treatment, issued pursuant to the act, were unconstitutional because the act did
not provide him with a hearing prior to the issuance of the warnings. The court upheld
the act and held the Secretary had inherent power to wam the public even without the
act. In dicta the court suggested plaintiff's only remedy would be an action for damages
for libel.
The recent decisions of Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), and Howard v. Lyons,
360 U.S. 593 (1959), according absolute privilege even to lower executive officers for
defamation, cast serious doubt on the availability of any remedy at all. See Oberst,
Torts, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 502 (1959).
9 68 Stat. 511 (1954), 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (1958).
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know whether this is true or how to establish a safe tolerance.mo The
Secretary indicated further that he would "oppose any attempt to take
the cancer clause out of the Food Additives Amendment, and . . .
[would] support the inclusion of such a clause in the color bill which
is now before the Congress.mi
At this writing, the cranberry situation has been resolved by
announcement of a "Cranberry Certification Plan" whereby Government approved safety testing procedures are being carried out by
industry, and cleared lots will be authorized to bear official safety certification statements on their containers.12
Food Additives.-Definitions and Procedural and Interpretive
Regulations which implement the requirements of the Food Additives
Amendment were issued this year .13 Included therein is the list of
additives which are exempted from tolerances because of the general
recognition of their safety ("GRAS") for their specified uses. "GRAS"
is crucial because it is the starting point14 to whether a substance shall
be subjected to the act. Who shall be the "experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate" safety and what shall be the
criteria whereby their opinions of safety become a "general recognition" poses the initial issue for determination.
For additives in use prior to 1958, "experience in common use in
food" may be considered as well as "scientific procedures"; but new
additives must be pretested for safety before use. In evaluating the
safety tests the administration will consider again the opinions of
experts, cumulative effects in the diet, and the probable consumption
of the additive. No safety tolerance will issue where the cancer-clause
applies16 or where the proposed use will "promote deception of the
consumer"; nor where the data does not "establish that such use
would accomplish the intended physical or other technical effect."
Litigation will probably settle the interpretation of the quoted phrases
although the amendment is clearly concerned with safety rather than
functional values. The Secretary should not pass on the benefits of
2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. 1l 7532 (1959).
Ibid.
Statement by Secretary Flemming, Nov. 19, 1959, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. 1l 7534 (1959).
13 24 Fed. Reg. 2434 (1959).
14 See Goodrich, The Beginning Point Under the Food-Additives AmendmentWhat Substances Do Qualified Experts Generally Recognize as Safe?, 14 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 584 (1959).
lo In tests of twenty-four wa.,:es used for milk cartons, it has been shown that
one wa.,: contained a known carcinogene which produces cancer in laboratory animals.
The studies are not final and no action has yet been taken. Statement by Secretary
Flemming, Nov. 10, 1959, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep.1! 7532 (1959).
10
11
12
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an additive, but merely determine whether it will do what the petitioner
proposes it to do. 16
Chemicals used in the production of containers and packages are
subject to the testing and other requirements of the act if they may
reasonably be expected to become a component, or to affect the characteristics of food, as by "migration" of the substance from the package to the food. The scientific problems here are vast and complicated.
Migrations will vary as to the types and state ( frozen, liquid, etc.) of
food, the types of packages, storage conditions and other factors.
Safety tests for each condition will present a time-consuming task
entailing high costs which surely are quite beyond the range of smaller
businesses.17
State Legislation.-Four states this year enacted basic Food
and Drug legislation patterned in whole or in part on the 1938 Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 18 In addition, the proclamation of the
statehood of Alaska added another Copeland-type statute19 to the
final total of thirty-one states.
Interrogatories in Seizure Actions.-Under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act the Government may institute both an in rem
action against adulterated or misbranded goods and criminal proceedings against anyone who shares in the responsibility for the distribution of the violative product. United States v. 49 Jars . . . Tranquilease20 considered whether a corporation could escape answering
written interrogatories under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33
because the individual chosen to answer elected to protect himself
through the fifth amendment, since the act of answering might tend
to make him a "responsible person"21 and amenable to the criminal
sanctions of the act. The court held, in an equitable solution, that the
corporation must answer, but that it should select someone to answer
16 See Oser, Recent Developments on the Food Additives Front, 14 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 254 (1959).
17 See Kaufman, Food Packaging and the 1958 Food Additives Amendment, 14
Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 649 (1959).
18 Idaho Sess. Laws Reg. Sess. 1959, ch. 153; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 560, § 40 (SmithHurd Supp. 1959); R.I. Pub. Laws 1959, ch. 56; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 4051-71
(Supp. 1959).
19 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 40-5A-1 (Supp. 1958).
20 23 F.R.D. 192, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. R 7463 (D.D.C. 1958). Two
other cases adopted the same approach. United States v. 42 Jars ... "Bee Royale
Capsules," 264 F.2d 666, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. R 7478 (3d Cir. 1959);
United States v. 3963 Bottles . . . Enerjol, 265 F.2d 332, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. R 7489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959).
21 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). See also United States v.
Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851
(1948).
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who had in no way participated in the questionable transaction.22
Prosecution of Physicians.-In Brown v. United States,23 reported herein last year, the prosecution of a licensed physician for
selling prescription drugs without a prescription was upheld by the
Fifth Circuit. A similar case arose before it again this year. In De
Freese v. United States2 4 the defendant physician sold barbituates in
lots of between five and twenty thousand pills to an FDA inspector
posing as a truck driver. The defendant contended on appeal from his
conviction that section 503 (b) ( 1) applied only to the retail sale of
drugs. De Freese maintained that he was operating as a wholesaler
and, since the statute provides that barbituates "shall be dispensed"
only upon prescription, his operations were outside the prohibition.
The court held, however, that the act covered both the retail and
wholesale levels. It answered the charge that such a holding would
require prosecution of all wholesale distributors by reference to section 353(b)(3) which authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations
dispensing with the requirements of these provisions when such requirements are not necessary for the public health.
In a companion case25 bearing the same name the court held that
the Government's burden of proving an interstate shipment was satisfied by the testimony of an expert witness that the drug was produced
in a jurisdiction different from that in which the prohibited sale took
place. This fact was demonstrated by identification of microscopic
markings on the tablets which exhibit, in effect, the "fingerprints"
of each company's stamping machine.
Administrative Res Judicata.-Since jurisdiction over foods, drugs,
and cosmetics is divided among several federal agencies, it is natural
to expect the question of res judicata to be raised. During the past
year two cases, United States v. 42 Jars . . . "Bee Royale Capsules"26
and United States v. 3963 Bottles . . . Enerjol,27 were decided in
which action by the Post Office Department was held not to foreclose
subsequent proceedings by the Food and Drug Administration involving the same product. But, in United States v. One Carton, More or
2'i This solution poses no particular difficulty, since Rule 33 does not require the
answerer to have personal knowledge of the facts. 4 Moore, Federal Practice ll 33.07, at
2277 (2d ed. 1950).
23 250 F.2d 745, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. ll 7426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 938 (1958), 34 N.Y.UL. Rev. 244, in 1958 Ann. Survey Am. L. 211 (1959).
24 270 F.2d 730, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. l! 7517 (5th Cir. 1959).
2u De Freese v. United States, 270 F.2d 732, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. ll
7518 (5th Cir. 1959).
26 264 F.2d 666, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. l! 7478 (3d Cir. 1959).
27 265 F.2d 332, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. ll 7489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 931 (1959).
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Less,28 where the Government contended that a judgment in a criminal
action should be res judicata in a subsequent seizure action against
the product upon which the criminal prosecution had been based, the
Government prevailed.
Claimant's position was weak in both the Bee Royale and Enerjol
cases. As a result of proceedings by the Post Office Department, agreements had been signed whereby certain claims were no longer to be
made for the product. It was noted in the Bee Royale case that the
claimant in the seizure action was not the same party who entered into
the Post Office settlement and that no privity between the two had
been shown. This, in addition to the reluctance of the court to consider the two governmental agencies in privity, constituted the rationale of the opinion. In the Enerjol case the court referred to a
clause in the prior settlement which stated that "its filing will not act as
a defense or relieve the undersigned [claimant's president] of responsibility for violation of any other statute." This provision, in conjunction with the fact that the issues to be determined under the two
statutes were different, led the court to distinguish the cases of United
States v. Willard Tablet Co.29 and George H. Lee Co. v. FTC,30 and to
find that there was no bar to the FDA action.
28 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep.

U 7492 (N.D. Ill. 1959).

29 141 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1944).
so 113 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1940).
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